The hardline islamists are contained in the South (Dark Green), while the pirate gangs operate out of Puntland (Blue) mostly. Somaliland (Yellow) has the least pirate activity.
Puntland, like Somaliland, has maintained a large degree of autonomy from the more chaotic South.
These are the sites of the major pirate bases. None of them are located in formerly British Somaliland.
And piracy doesn’t stop in Somalia. It is a global problem. However, we can probably solve Somalia’s problem is the worst, the most recent and the most public.
The Somalia Solution
The recent rescue of the captain of the Maersk Alabama after the killing of his three pirate captors by US Navy Seals has cast new media attention on the piracy problem in Somalia. Many voices have come forward to suggest beefing up security on the high seas against pirates or attacking pirates’ land-based “lairs” in Somalia. Both of these are policy options for the short-term, but in the long-term they will not solve the problem. They will most likely increase the level of violence off the coast of Somalia and, as more US forces and citizens are involved, increase the danger of international terrorist moving into the piracy business against US interests.
The roots of Somalia piracy lie in the anarchy that has gripped that country since the dictatorship of Mohamed Siad Barre collapsed in 1991. Barre ruled Somalia since it’s independence from Britain and Italy in 1960; before that, the northern part of Somalia, know as Somaliland (see map) was ruled by the British. The Italians ruled Puntland and Southern Somalia. The Italian and British parts joined in 1960 after the withdrawal of the colonial powers.
Since Barre’s government collapsed, the US, the UN, the African Union (AU) and Ethiopia have all tried to pacify Southern Somalia centered on Mogadishu. Many people did not notice that international fishing trawlers from as far as South Korea, Japan and Spain were illegally fishing off the coast of Puntland (Northeast Somalia) and driving the local fishermen out of business. There are even reports of European companies dumping toxic and nuclear waste off the coast of Puntland
This prompted many Somali fishermen to begin arming themselves. The foreign fishing vessels shot at them with guns and water hoses so the Somalis began shooting back. They formed the current pirate groups such as the National Volunteer Coastguard of Somalia and the Somali Marines in order to defend their fishing grounds. That is not to say they should be pitied today. While these groups started out defensively, they have morphed over the last 20 years into full-fledged international criminal pirate gangs.
However, their primary origin is critical to remember because it shows us that these groups are not ideological. Rather, they are focused on making money. There are virtually no reports of hostages being killed as the ransoms are usually paid. They appear to be very business oriented.
This is even more important to remember following the media storm of the US Navy SEAL snipers killing the three pirates.
Up until now the pirates have refrained from killing or harming anyone and the international community has been happy to simply pay them the ransoms. At the same time, the pirates have been using their new-found power and money to resist the Islamists who famously swept through Southern Somalia. Those same Islamists were driven out of power by Ethiopia just as stunningly. Few noticed, however, that the Islamists never got very far north. The reason they did not is because the region of Puntland, where most of the pirates are from, has been semi-autonomous from the rest of Somalia and because the pirates had the money and the guns to fight back. This has been demonstrated a couple of times. One of the most famous was when Saudi Arabia’s ARAMCO encouraged the Islamists to drive up to Eyl and recover their Super Tanker Sirius Star. Saudi Arabia ended up paying the ransom as the Islamists failed totally in their mission. The pirates have also clashed with the Islamists in Kismayo and Haradhere (see maps).
If the pirates perceive the US as an enemy because we kill them, the Islamists may be able to sway them into joining their cause for emotional reasons.
If we strengthen our naval efforts to stop the piracy, we may weaken the pirates’ economic and military position relative to the Islamists, tipping the balance in Islamists’ favor and allowing them to sweep through another third of Somalia (they only own the southern third right now [see maps]).
If we bomb the pirates, we will most certainly weaken them relative to the Islamists, on top of pushing them further into the Islamist camp with the inevitable killing of civilians. We will also destroy what little economy there is in Somalia, no matter how illicit, which can only serve to drive the pirates and the populations they support away from us.
Therefore, the only long-term solution to the Somali piracy problem is to look at Somalia as distinct political entities and deal with each accordingly.
Somaliland, the formerly British northern most chunk of Somalia, should be engaged with Free Trade Areas. They hold elections, have a functioning government and have no pirate bases in their territory.
Southern Somalia should be contained. While the “capital” of Somalia, Mogadishu, is down there, and the transitional capital at Baidoa as well, the area itself is a chaotic mess of Islamists and warlords; if the international community got directly involved, as the Ethiopians and AU have, it will probably exacerbate the situation. For now the AU, the Ethiopians, the pirates and the international naval force can keep them contained in Southern Somalia. We can also cut deals with the “moderate” Islamists (Union of Islamic Courts) and split them off from the radicals (the Shabab).
The primary focus of the international community should be in Puntland. It may even be advisable to move the Somali capital to Puntland. After that, serious nation building efforts will have to be undertaken. This will include millions of dollars for establishing the transitional government, building a Somali army, Somali police and a Somali navy. Some of the pirates could even be hired for these positions. This would break the economic back of the pirates and create a whole new employer in Somalia. The pirates are businessmen, primarily, so they can be co-opted into a new government. It isn’t pretty, but history has shown that this is how most human governments have been formed. Eventually the country will draw away from the chaos of piracy and establish itself as a stable country. When that is done, Somaliland and Puntland can turn their focus to dealing with the Islamists in Southern Somalia.
For further reading:
http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13496719
http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_fabrik&view=visualization&controller=visualization.googlemap&Itemid=219
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/somalia.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Somalia_map_states_regions_districts.png
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piracy_in_Somalia#cite_note-Reuters:_2008-04-23-25
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7650415.stm
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5huZX1j35evP_2f7juvNifVKrMboQ
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=6288745
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122731000016149251.html
http://blog.marketingdoctor.tv/2008/11/22/brand-winners-and-losers-pirates-and-citigroup.aspx
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pirates.htm
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/yacht-raid-reveals-hitech-somali-pirate-network-807022.html
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1892376,00.html
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/somalia.html
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html
The Baltic Dry Index, a measure of commodity shipping costs, rose to this year’s high as rents for panamax vessels that haul minerals and grains climbed the most in a week since May.Shipping News
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